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Abstract—Formal verification is used to establish the compli-
ance of software and hardware systems with important classes of
requirements. System compliance with functional requirements
is frequently analysed using techniques such as model checking,
and theorem proving. In addition, a technique called quantitative
verification supports the analysis of the reliability, performance,
and other quality-of-service (QoS) properties of systems that
exhibit stochastic behaviour. In this paper, we extend the ap-
plicability of quantitative verification to the common scenario
when the probabilities of transition between some or all states
of the Markov models analysed by the technique are unknown,
but observations of these transitions are available. To this end,
we introduce a theoretical framework, and a tool chain that
establish confidence intervals for the QoS properties of a software
system modelled as a Markov chain with uncertain transition
probabilities. We use two case studies from different application
domains to assess the effectiveness of the new quantitative
verification technique. Our experiments show that disregarding
the above source of uncertainty may significantly affect the
accuracy of the verification results, leading to wrong decisions,
and low-quality software systems.
Index Terms—Quantitative verification, probabilistic model
checking, quality-of-service requirements, software systems,
Markov chains.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
FACT Formal verificAtion with Confidence inTervals
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
IDTMC Interval-valued Discrete-Time Markov Chain
LWB Low-power Wireless Bus
MC Markov Chain
PCTL Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
PMC Parametric Markov Chain
QoS Quality of Service
UMC Uncertain Markov Chain
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
NOTATION
M Markov chain
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s, s1, s2, . . . states of a Markov chain
S set of states of a Markov chain
n number of states of a Markov chain
pij probability of transition from state si to state sj
[p
ij
, pij ] confidence interval for transition probability pij
1− αi confidence level of simultaneous confidence
intervals [p
i1
, pi1], [pi2, pi2], . . . , [pin, pin]
π path over a Markov chain
PathsM(s) set of infinite paths over M that start with s
Prs probability measure over Paths
M(s)
AP atomic proposition set
P probabilistic PCTL operator
R reward PCTL operator
⊲⊳ relational operator (any of <, ≤, ≥, >)
p probability
Φ, Φ1, Φ2 PCTL state formulae
Φ(pi1j1 , . . .) algebraic expression of state formula Φ
Φ1UΦ2 unbounded until PCTL formula
Φ1U
≤kΦ2 bounded until PCTL formula, k ∈ N
FΦ future state PCTL formula
F≤kΦ bounded future state PCTL formula, k ∈ N
Ψ PCTL path formula
|= satisfaction relation over the states S and the
paths PathsM(s), s ∈ S, of a Markov chain
[a, b] confidence interval for analysed QoS property
1− α confidence level for analysed QoS property
O set of state transition observations
N number of observations
Prob(x∈X) probability that x∈X
R1, R2, . . . QoS requirements
I. INTRODUCTION
SOFTWARE finds many applications in business- andsafety-critical systems in domains as diverse as e-
commerce, healthcare, and defence. In these applications,
software enables activities that are too complex, too costly,
or too dangerous for humans to carry out alone. The conse-
quences of failures in such critical software are enormous,
and can include financial loss or loss of human lives. To
avoid these consequences, critical software has to comply with
strict functional and quality-of-service (QoS) requirements at
all times.
Formal methods are among the most effective and widely
used means for developing high-quality software systems.
2They comprise mathematically based techniques with a track
record of supporting multiple stages of the software lifecycle
in real-world scenarios [1], [2]. Established techniques such
as formal specification [3], design by contract [4], and model
checking [5] focus primarily on modelling and analysing
functional aspects of software systems. In contrast, a more
recently introduced technique called quantitative verification
[6] supports the analysis of reliability, performance, and other
QoS properties of software. This technique models software
behaviour using finite state transition systems such as Markov
chains and probabilistic automata; and uses temporal logics
extended with probabilities, costs, and rewards to express and
analyse QoS properties of the modelled software. Examples
of properties that can be established using quantitative ver-
ification include the probability that a fault occurs within a
specified time period, and the expected response time of a
software system in a given scenario.
Extensive research over the past decade has produced ef-
ficient quantitative verification algorithms for a wide range
of probabilistic, nondeterministic, and timed automata mod-
els [7], [8], [9]. The implementation of these algorithms
within probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM [10], [11],
MRMC [12], [13], and Ymer [14] has led to a wide adoption
of the technique in software engineering, and many other
domains. In software engineering, quantitative verification has
been proven effective in modelling and analysing reliability,
performance, and cost-related QoS properties of software
architectures both at design time [15], and more recently
at run time [16], [17]. Successful applications range from
service selection in service-oriented architectures [18], [19],
and configuration of cloud-deployed software [20], [21], to
QoS property analysis for software product lines [22], and
dynamic power management [23].
Furthermore, recent research tackling the limited scalability
of quantitative verification has produced several promising
solutions. These solutions include parametric [24], assume-
guarantee [25], [26], and incremental [27], [28] quantitative
verification techniques; and approaches that reduce the size
of quantitative verification problems by using caching, look
ahead, and nearly-optimal reconfiguration [29].
Despite these advances, one problem remains largely un-
solved. The use of quantitative verification assumes that the
analysed models accurately reflect the actual behaviour of the
real software. Like in the case of traditional model checking,
it is typically possible to satisfy this assumption with respect
to the structure of the models. However, the probabilities
associated with the state transitions of quantitative verification
models are much more difficult to establish correctly. The
current practice of using their point estimates provided by
domain experts, or inferred through model fitting [30] to
log data or run-time observations, yields values affected by
unquantified estimation errors. The verification compounds
and propagates these errors, in ways that are unknown but
likely to be significant, given the nonlinear characteristics
of these models. This raises concerns about the validity of
decisions based on quantitative verification results, and limits
the applicability of the technique.
Our paper addresses this important limitation of quantitative
verification. To this end, we introduce a new quantitative
verification approach that generates confidence intervals for
the analysed properties of a Markov chain (MC). Our For-
mal verificAtion with Confidence inTervals (FACT) approach
analyses MCs with unknown state transition probabilities,
when observations of these transitions are available from logs
or run-time observations of the modelled system. Given a
property of the modelled software system that is formally
expressed in probabilistic temporal logic, and a confidence
level 1−α ∈ (0, 1), FACT synthesises a 1−α confidence
interval for the property. As a result, FACT enables the
rigorous analysis of the reliability, performance, cost, and
other QoS properties of software systems when the transition
probabilities between the states of the MCs used to model
these systems are approximated by sets of observations. The
main contributions of the paper include the following.
1) We devise the first theoretical framework for quantitative
verification with confidence intervals.
2) We present a tool chain that implements the FACT
theoretical framework.
3) We describe two case studies that show the effective-
ness of the FACT approach on software systems from
different application domains.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II pro-
vides the necessary background on Markov chains, probabilis-
tic computation tree logic, and probabilistic model checking;
and Section III introduces a running example that we use to
illustrate the steps of our verification approach. Sections IV
through V describe the FACT theoretical framework, and the
tool chain we assembled to reify this theory. The evaluation
of the FACT approach using two case studies from different
application domains is presented in Section VI. This section is
followed by a discussion of several limitations of our approach,
and of possible ways to overcome them in Section VII. Next,
Section VIII compares our approach with related research,
and Section IX concludes the paper with a summary and a
discussion of future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Markov chains
Definition 1. A Markov chain (MC) over a set of atomic
propositions AP is a tuple
M = (S, s1,P, L) (1)
comprising a finite set of states S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, an initial
state s1, a transition probability matrix P : S×S → [0, 1], and
a labelling function L : S → 2AP . For any states si, sj ∈ S,
P(si, sj) represents the probability of transitioning from state
si to state sj , so
∑
sj∈S
P(si, sj) = 1. For simplicity, we will
often use the notation pij = P(si, sj).
A path π overM is a possibly infinite sequence of states from
S such that, for any adjacent states s and s′ in π, P(s, s′) > 0.
The m-th state on a path π, m ≥ 1, is denoted π(m). Finally,
for any state s ∈ S, PathsM(s) represents the set of all
infinite paths over M that start with state s.
3To compute the probability that a Markov chain (1) behaves
in a specified way when in state s ∈ S, we use a probability
measure Prs defined over Paths
M(s) such that [31], [32]
Prs({π ∈ PathsM(s) | π = si1si2si3 . . . sim . . .}) =
pi1i2pi2i3 . . . pim−1im ,
(2)
where {π ∈ PathsM(s) | π = si1si2si3 . . . sim . . .} rep-
resents the set of all infinite paths that start with the prefix
si1si2si3 . . . sim (i.e., the cylinder set of this prefix). Further
details about this probability measure and its properties are
available from [31], [32].
Our FACT approach to formal verification operates with
parametric Markov chains (also called incomplete Markov
chains [33], or uncertain Markov chains [34]).
Definition 2. A parametric Markov chain (PMC) is a Markov
chain (1) for which some of the transition probabilities pij are
parameters with domain [0, 1].
Note that PMC transition probabilities could also be specified
as rational functions over a set of variables with domain R
[35], [36], [37]. Because our approach involves the compu-
tation of confidence intervals for each unknown transition
probability, we adopted the above definition, which treats
transition probabilities as variables. We discuss the extension
of FACT to PMCs with transition probabilities specified as
rational functions in Section VII.
To extend the range of system properties verified using
Markov chains, they can be augmented with rewards. These
are nonnegative values associated with the states and transi-
tions of an MC or PMC.
They correspond to system properties such as throughput or
profit. Depending on the analysed property, these values can
also be interpreted as costs. Examples of costs that can be
expressed using reward-augmented MCs and PMCs include
resource use, energy consumption, and price. Accordingly,
the verification of reward-based properties aims to establish
that costs comply with upper bounds specified by the system
requirements, and rewards satisfy the required lower bounds.
Definition 3. A reward structure over a Markov chain M =
(S, s1,P, L) is a pair of functions (ρ, ι) comprising a state
reward function ρ : S → R≥0 (a vector), and a transition
reward function ι : S × S → R≥0 (a matrix).
B. Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
To formally verify properties of software systems, these
properties are expressed using precise mathematical for-
malisms. Markov chains support the quantitative verification
of QoS requirements expressed in probabilistic computation
tree logic [38], [39], which is a temporal logic with the syntax
defined below.
Definition 4. Let AP be a set of atomic propositions; and
a ∈ AP , p ∈ [0, 1], k ∈ N, r ∈ R, and ⊲⊳ ∈ {≥, >,<,≤}.
Then a state formula Φ, and a path formula Ψ in probabilistic
computation tree logic (PCTL) are defined by the grammar
Φ ::= true | a | Φ ∧ Φ | ¬Φ | P⊲⊳p[Ψ], (3)
Ψ ::= XΦ | ΦUΦ | ΦU≤kΦ; (4)
and a reward state formula is defined by the grammar
Φ ::= R⊲⊳r[I=k] | R⊲⊳r[C≤k] | R⊲⊳r[FΦ] | R⊲⊳r[S]. (5)
State formulae include the logical operators ∧ and ¬, which
allow the formulation of disjunction (∨), implication (⇒), and
false . State formulae extend computation tree logic [40] by
replacing the universal path quantifier A and the existential
path quantifier E with the probabilistic operator P , which
specifies bounds on the probability of the system evolution.
The semantics of PCTL are defined with a satisfaction
relation |= over the states S and the paths PathsM(s), s ∈ S,
of an MC (1). Thus, s |= Φ means Φ is satisfied in state s, or
Φ is true in state s. For any state s ∈ S, we have: s |= true;
s |= a iff a ∈ L(s); s |= ¬Φ iff ¬(s |= Φ); and s |= Φ1 ∧ Φ2
iff s |= Φ1 and s |= Φ2. A state formula P⊲⊳p[Ψ] is satisfied
in a state s if the probability of the future evolution of the
system satisfying Ψ satisfies ⊲⊳ p:
s |= P⊲⊳p(Ψ) iff Prs({π ∈ PathsM(s) | π |= Ψ}) ⊲⊳ p.
The semantics of the three path formulae from (4) are de-
scribed below.
• The next state formula XΦ is satisfied by a path π iff Φ
is satisfied in the next state of π (i.e., in state π(2)).
• The bounded until formula Φ1U
≤kΦ2 is satisfied by a
path π iff Φ1 is satisfied in each of the first x states of
π for some x < k, and Φ2 is satisfied in the (x + 1)-th
state of π.
• The unbounded until formula Φ1UΦ2 is satisfied by a
path π iff Φ1 is true in each of the first x> 0 states of
π, and Φ2 is true in the (x+1)-th state of π.
The notation F≤kΦ ≡ trueU≤kΦ, and FΦ ≡ trueUΦ are
used when the first part of a bounded until, and until formula,
respectively, are true .
In addition, given a reward structure in the form from
Definition 3, PCTL was extended with reward constraints
that support the specification of both expected and cumulative
rewards [41]. Thus, the reward operator R can be used
to analyse the expected cost at timestep k (R⊲⊳r[I=k]), the
expected cumulative cost up to time step k (R⊲⊳r[C≤k]), the
expected cumulative cost to reach a future state that satisfies a
property Φ (R⊲⊳r[FΦ]), and the expected steady-state reward
in the long run (R⊲⊳r[S]). The model checking algorithms from
[41] can be used to analyse these reward properties efficiently.
Further details about the semantics of PCTL, and reward-
extended PCTL are available from [38], [39], and from [41],
respectively.
C. Probabilistic model checking
Efficient probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM [11],
MRMC [12], and Ymer [14] employ symbolic model check-
ing algorithms to automate the analysis of PCTL-specified
properties of MCs. These algorithms establish if a formula
P⊲⊳p[Ψ] is satisfied by calculating the actual probability that
Ψ is satisfied, and comparing it with the bound p. Therefore,
calculating the actual probability does not add any complexity,
and the extended PCTL syntax P=?[Ψ] can be used to obtain
this probability. The extended syntax is applicable to the
4outermost P operator of a P⊲⊳p[Ψ] formula, and is compliant
with the input of most probabilistic model checkers.
This extended syntax also applies to reward PCTL formulae,
for which R=?[I=k], R=?[C≤k], R=?[FΦ], and R=?[S] are
used in a similar way. Note that PCTL formulae that use this
extended syntax can define QoS attributes (or QoS properties)
of the modelled system, while PCTL formulae that use a fixed
bound can be used to define QoS requirements.
The traditional approach to verifying PCTL-encoded prop-
erties of a PMC involves using point estimates of its unknown
transition probabilities, to derive an MC that refines the
original PMC. This MC is then analysed using a probabilistic
model checker as described above. The transition probability
estimates can come from domain experts, or can be inferred
from execution traces of the modelled system. In the latter
case, the execution traces may be obtained from system logs
[42], [43], or through system run-time monitoring [44].
D. Parametric model checking
Related research proposed an alternative approach to ver-
ifying PMCs termed parametric model checking [24], [35],
[36], [37], [45], [46]. Given a PCTL property Φ, parametric
model checking produces a symbolic expression of Φ in
which the PMC parameters appear as variables. The symbolic
expression is a multivariate rational function, and its synthesis
may be computationally expensive. However, this synthesis is
performed only once, after which the expression can be used
for multiple purposes, e.g., for trend as well as sensitivity or
perturbation analysis [47], and to evaluate the QoS property
associated with Φ at run time, when the values of the PMC
parameters are determined [24].
Research on parametric model checking has led to signif-
icant advances over the past decade. The first approach to
parametric model checking is due to Daws [45]. This approach
uses a language-theoretic technique to convert the PMC into
a finite automaton that is then used to obtain a regular expres-
sion whose recursive evaluation yields the required symbolic
expression. The approach works for reachability properties
without nested probabilistic operators, but is limited to PMCs
with low numbers of states n because the regular expression is
of size nΘ(logn). This limitation is alleviated in [35] by using
a combination of techniques for state-space reduction, and for
the early evaluation of the regular expression. This approach
outperforms Daws’ original solution in many scenarios of
practical relevance, although its worst-case performance is the
same as in [45].
The recent research in [37] significantly improves the effi-
ciency of parametric model checking through using a new state
elimination strategy based on recursively decomposing the
analysed PMC into strongly connected components, and a new
method for executing operations such as the greatest common
divisor directly on partial factorisations of polynomials. The
experimental results presented in [37] show that the new
approach speeds up parametric model checking by several
orders of magnitude compared to previous solutions.
Finally, parametric model checking is supported by the latest
version of the probabilistic model checker PRISM, as well as
by dedicated verification tools such as PARAM [46].
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Fig. 1. PMC MwebApp modelling the handling of an HTTP request.
III. RUNNING EXAMPLE
We will illustrate the steps of our FACT approach using a
business-critical web application comprising an HTTP proxy
server, a web server, and an application server. To serve client
requests, the web application accesses structured data stored
in a database, and static content (e.g., text files, and images)
located on a file server. Both types of content are cached by
ad-hoc cache servers.
The parametric Markov chain in Fig. 1 models the function-
ality that handles an HTTP request within the web application.
Each PMC state represents a stage of the handling process.
The initial state s1 corresponds to the request being received,
and the shaded states are absorbing states, i.e., states that once
entered cannot be left. These states indicate the outcome of the
request handling, i.e., whether the request handling succeeds
(state s9) or fails due to an unavailable server (state s8), or
to the overloading of a component of the application (state
s10). The states s2 to s7 correspond to the web application
performing the operations indicated by their labels.
The transitions between the transient states s1 through s7,
and between these states and the absorbing states, model
the control flow for handling a request. For example, the
transitions (s1, s2), and (s1, s4) model the events of dy-
namic content has been requested, and static content has
been requested, respectively; and the self-transition (s2, s2)
corresponds to an HTTP self-redirect. The probabilities of
the outgoing transitions from states s1 and s4 through s7
are unknown, or may change over time. For example, the
transitions (s4, s9), and (s6, s9) model the cache hit for the
file server, and the database, respectively, both of which have
probabilities that depend on the (unknown) distribution of the
user requests.
The non-absorbing states of the PMC are labelled by a pair
of numbers in the form n1/n2. The values n1 and n2 represent
the average cost of the operation associated with the non-
absorbing state in tenths of a cent, and its average duration
in milliseconds, respectively. These values define two reward
structures over the PMC, a cost structure (n1), and a response
time structure (n2), where the reward values not shown in
Fig. 1 (i.e., those associated with the PMC absorbing states
and transitions) are all zero.
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Fig. 2. FACT confidence interval synthesis.
IV. APPROACH
A. Overview
Our FACT approach establishes confidence intervals for
PCTL-formalised QoS properties of a software system, and
checks whether these confidence intervals satisfy the con-
straints specified by the QoS requirements of the system. The
four inputs taken by FACT are shown in Fig. 2, and are
described below.
1) The first input is a parametric Markov chain M =
(S, s1,P, L) of the analysed system.
2) The second input is a PCTL state formula Φ for a QoS
requirement of interest; Φ can be a probabilistic state
formula P⊲⊳p[Ψ] or a reward formula (5).
3) The third input is an error level α ∈ (0, 1).
4) The final input is an observation function O : S → Nn
that maps each state si ∈ S to a tuple
O(si) = (Ni1, Ni2, . . . , Nin) (6)
such that Nij represents the number of transitions from
state si to state sj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, during a fixed period
of time over which all transitions were observed and
counted. We will sometimes refer to O as the observa-
tion set, in the sense that it represents the set of map-
pings O={s1 7→O(s1), s2 7→O(s2), . . . , sn 7→O(sn)}.
For the analysis of a PCTL state formula Φ = P⊲⊳p[Ψ],
FACT synthesises a (1− α) confidence interval [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1]
for the probability that Ψ is satisfied in the initial state s1 given
the observations O. Thus, if our FACT procedure is applied
repeatedly under identical conditions, a fraction of (1−α)
of the generated confidence intervals will contain the value
Prs1({π ∈ PathsM(s1) | π |= Ψ}). We write formally
Prob
(
Prs1({π ∈ PathsM(s1) | π |= Ψ}) /∈ [a, b]
)
< α.
Next, FACT establishes if [a, b] ⊲⊳ p using the rules below,
which extend the application of the relational operators <, ≤,
≥, and > to the comparison between an interval [a, b] ⊆ R
and a scalar x ∈ R:
[a, b] < x iff b < x,
[a, b] ≤ x iff b ≤ x,
[a, b] ≥ x iff a ≥ x, and
[a, b] > x iff a > x.
(7)
We can now define the following concepts.
Definition 5. If the (1−α) confidence interval [a, b] calculated
above satisfies [a, b] ⊲⊳ p, we write
s1 |=α,O P⊲⊳p[Ψ] (8)
to indicate that P⊲⊳p[Ψ] is satisfied with confidence (1−α) in
state s1, given the observations O. We will sometimes write
M |=α,O P⊲⊳p[Ψ] (9)
to indicate that, given the observations O, P⊲⊳p[Ψ] is satisfied
with confidence level (1− α) in the initial state of M.
We handle the analysis of a reward formula R⊲⊳r[·] from (5)
similarly. First, we synthesise a (1 − α) confidence interval
[a, b] ⊆ R+ for the expected reward R=?[·]. Next, we establish
if [a, b] ⊲⊳ r, in which case we use the notation M |=α,O
R⊲⊳r[·] to indicate that the expected reward satisfies ⊲⊳ r with
probability at least (1−α) under the observations O.
Given a model M, a formula Φ, an error level α, and a set
of observations O with the characteristics described above,
the FACT synthesis of (1 − α) confidence intervals for Φ is
performed in two stages (Fig. 2).
1) Parametric model checking. In this stage, FACT gener-
ates an algebraic expression for Φ by using parametric
model checking as explained in Section II-C. This
algebraic expression is a multivariate rational function
Φ(pi1,j1 , pi2,j2 , . . . , pimjm) that depends on some or
all unknown transition probabilities of M [36], i.e.,
1≤m≤n2, and 1 ≤ ik, jk ≤ n, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
2) Confidence interval inference. In its second stage, FACT
uses the observations O to obtain confidence intervals
for the unknown transition probabilities that appear in
the algebraic expression, and uses them to derive the
required confidence interval for Φ. The calculations car-
ried out in this stage are based on the FACT theoretical
framework presented in the next section.
Example 1. Suppose that we want to establish with 95%
confidence if the web application from our running example
satisfies the QoS requirement that at least 2% of the requests
are handled without accessing the web server or the file server
(e.g., to decide if maintaining a cache server for web pages
is justified). Also, assume that we monitored the behaviour
of the system, and collected observations of all its outgoing
transitions from the states of the PMCMwebApp in Fig. 1 that
are associated with unknown transition probabilities.
We can address this problem by performing the confidence
interval synthesis from Fig. 2 for the four inputs described
below.
1) The parametric Markov chain M is MwebApp.
2) The PCTL state formula Φ is P≥0.02[Ψ], where
Ψ = ¬(WebServer ∨FileServer)UHttpResponse. (10)
3) The error level is α = 0.05.
4) The elements of the observation function O : S → N10
are defined by the observed outgoing transitions of
MwebApp. As an example, assume that the observed
outgoing transitions from state s1 ofMwebApp comprise
2705 transitions to s2, 3174 transitions to s4, and 5
6transitions to s8; and that the observed outgoing tran-
sitions from s4 consist of 2975 transitions to s5, 187
transitions to s9, and 12 transitions to s10. In these cir-
cumstances, O(s1) = (0, 2705, 0, 3174, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0),
and O(s4) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 2975, 0, 0, 0, 187, 12).
To establish if M |=α,O P⊲⊳p[Ψ], the first FACT stage uses
parametric model checking to obtain an algebraic expression
for Φ. The only infinite path that satisfies our path property Ψ
is π=s1s4s9s9 . . .. Therefore, according to (2), the algebraic
expression for our PCTL state formula is Φ(x2, y2) = x2y2.
This expression is used to compute a (1−α)=0.99 confidence
interval for P=?[Ψ] in the second FACT stage. To describe this
computation, we need the following theoretical framework.
B. Theoretical framework
We start by defining the concept of simultaneous confidence
intervals for a multinomial distribution [48], [49], [50].
Definition 6. Given a multinomial distribution with n >
1 possible outcomes of probabilities x1, x2, . . . , xn,
where
∑n
i=1 xi = 1, and a value α ∈ (0, 1),
the intervals I1, I2, . . . , In ⊆ [0, 1] are simultane-
ous (1 − α) confidence intervals for x1, x2, . . . , xn iff
Prob (x1 ∈ I1;x2 ∈ I2; . . . ;xn ∈ In) ≥ 1− α.
We can now introduce a result that enables the derivation
of a confidence interval for an algebraic expression from
simultaneous confidence intervals for disjoint subsets of its
parameters.
Proposition 1. Let M = (S, s1,P, L) be a PMC over an
atomic proposition set AP , and Φ = P⊲⊳p[Ψ] be a PCTL
state formula over AP . Assume that, for each state si ∈ S with
unknown outgoing transition probabilities, [p
i1
, pi1], [pi2, pi2],
. . . , [p
in
, pin] are simultaneous (1 − αi) confidence intervals
for the transition probabilities from si to each of the n states
in S. If the result of the parametric model checking of Φ is
Prs1({π∈PathsM(s1) |π |=Ψ})= Φ(pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm),
where pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm are m > 0 unknown transition
probabilities of M, and
a = min p
i1j1
≤ pi1j1 ≤ pi1j1
. . .
p
imjm
≤ pimjm ≤ pimjm∑n
j=1 pij = 1 for i ∈ I
Φ(pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm)
b = max p
i1j1
≤ pi1j1 ≤ pi1j1
. . .
pimjm ≤ pimjm ≤ pimjm∑n
j=1 pij = 1 for i ∈ I
Φ(pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm)
α = 1−∏i∈I (1− αi)
(11)
with I = {i1, i2, . . . , im}, then [a, b] is a (1− α) confidence
interval for Φ, i.e.,
Prob (Φ(pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm) /∈ [a, b]) < α.
Proof. For any i ∈ I , [p
i1
, pi1], [pi2, pi2], . . . , [pin, pin] are
simultaneous (1 − αi) confidence intervals for pi1, pi2, . . . ,
pin, so
∀i ∈ I • Prob

 ∧
(i,j)∈IJ
p
ij
≤ pij ≤ pij

 ≥ 1− αi,
where IJ = {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . , (im, jm)}. Given the mem-
oryless property of Markov chains, the transitions from differ-
ent states si are s-independent, so
Prob

∧
i∈I
∧
(i,j)∈IJ
p
ij
≤pij≤pij

≥∏
i∈I
(1−αi) = 1− α.
Because additionally
∑n
j=1 pij = 1 is always true for any
i ∈ I , we have Prob(a ≤ Φ(pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm) ≤ b) ≥
1− α, which proves the proposition.
Example 2. Consider again the PMCM from Fig. 1, and the
property Φ with the algebraic expression Φ(x2, y2) = x2y2
from Example 1. Suppose that for each state si with unknown
outgoing transition probabilities from M we established
(1−αi) confidence intervals for the transition probabilities
from si to other states of M. The property we want to
analyse depends on the transition probabilities x2, and y2,
which correspond to outgoing transitions from the PMC states
s4, and s1, respectively. We therefore focus our attention on
these two states. Let the confidence intervals associated with
state s1 be [y1, y1], [y2, y2], and [y3, y3] for y1, y2, and y3,
respectively; and the confidence intervals associated with state
s4 be [x1, x1], [x2, x2], and [x3, x3] for x1, x2, and x3. The
three elements from (11) are
a = min x2 ≤ x2 ≤ x2, y2 ≤ y2 ≤ y2
x1+x2+x3=1, y1+y2+y3=1
x2y2 = x2y2,
b = max x2 ≤ x2 ≤ x2, y2 ≤ y2 ≤ y2
x1+x2+x3=1, y1+y2+y3=1
x2y2 = x2y2,
α = 1− (1−α1)(1−α4).
Thus, according to Proposition 1, [x2y2, x2y2] is a (1− α)
confidence interval for Φ.
We use the result from Proposition 1 to derive a sufficient
condition for a PMC to satisfy a PCTL formula with a
confidence level (1− α) under a set of observations O.
Proposition 2. Let M = (S, s1,P, L) be a PMC over
an atomic proposition set AP , O an observation func-
tion (6), Φ = P⊲⊳p[Ψ] a PCTL state formula over AP , and
Φ(pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm) the result of the parametric model
checking of Φ, where pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm are unknown
transition probabilities of M as before. For any state si
associated with observations O(si) = (Ni1, Ni2, . . . , Nin),
and for any state sj ∈S, further let
p
ij
=
(
fij +
z2αi/2
2Ni
− zαi/2
√
fij(1−fij)+z2αi/2
/4Ni
Ni
)
· Ni
Ni+z2αi/2
,
and
pij=
(
fij +
z2αi/2
2Ni
+ zαi/2
√
fij(1−fij)+z2αi/2
/4Ni
Ni
)
· Ni
Ni+z2αi/2
(12)
7where zαi/2 is the (1−αi/2) quantile of the standard normal
distribution, Ni =
∑n
j=1Nij , and fij = Nij/Ni. Finally,
suppose that the bounds p
ij
and pij from (12), and the
associated αi values are used to calculate a, b, and α as
in (11), and assume that [a, b] ⊲⊳ p. Under these circumstances,
M |=α,O P⊲⊳p[Ψ].
Proof. The unknown outgoing transition probabilities pi1, pi2,
. . . , pin of a PMC state si represent the success probabilities
of a multinomial distribution with n success categories. Ac-
cording to [48], the intervals [p
i1
, pi1], [pi2, pi2], . . . , [pin, pin]
defined by (12) are simultaneous (1−αi) confidence intervals
for the success probabilities of an n-category multinomial
distribution for which Ni s-independent trials lead to Ni1, Ni2,
. . . , Nin observations of the n success categories. Therefore,
[p
i1
, pi1], [pi2, pi2], . . . , [pin, pin] are simultaneous (1 − αi)
confidence intervals for pi1, pi2, . . . , pin. It follows from
Proposition 1 that
Prob (Φ(pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm) /∈ [a, b]) < α.
Because additionally [a, b] ⊲⊳ p, we deduce that the probability
that P⊲⊳p[Ψ] is not satisfied in state s1 is below α, which
according to Definition 5 is denoted
M |=α,O P⊲⊳p[Ψ].
Note that numerous studies propose and discuss different
simultaneous confidence intervals for the success probabilities
of multinomial distributions, e.g., [51], [49], [48], [50], [52].
The confidence intervals (12) were proposed by Kwong and
Iglewicz [48], and achieve a good trade-off between computa-
tional complexity and precision, where by precision we mean
the width of the confidence interval. Nevertheless, other results
from literature can be substituted in (12) without affecting the
validity of the FACT theoretical framework.
Example 3. We will use the result from Proposition 2 to com-
pute a 95% confidence interval for the property Φ(x2, y2) =
x2y2 from our running example. Given the observations O
from Example 1, the number of outgoing transitions from
states s1, and s4 are respectively
N1 = 5884, and N4 = 3174; (13)
and the frequencies for these transitions are
f1,2 =
2705
5884 , f1,4 =
3174
5884 , f1,8 =
5
5884 ,
f4,5 =
2975
3174 , f4,9 =
187
3174 , f4,10 =
12
3174
. (14)
We use these frequencies and the result in (12) to calculate
confidence intervals for the transition probabilities x2 = p4,9
and y2 = p1,4, which Φ depends on. We calculate the two
confidence intervals with confidence levels
(1−α1)=(1−α4) =
√
0.95, (15)
because this will support the computation of the confidence
interval for Φ with confidence level (1−α)=(1−α1)(1−α4)=
0.95, as established in Example 2. Using (12), and the values
in (13) through (15) to calculate confidence intervals for x2,
and y2, we obtain
x2 ≈ 0.0386, x2 ≈ 0.0805, y2 ≈ 0.5069, y2 ≈ 0.5718,
so [x2y2, x2y2] ≈ [0.0195, 0.0461] is a 0.95 confidence inter-
val for Φ. Note that the 0.02 bound from the QoS requirement
introduced in Example 1 belongs to this confidence interval.
Thus, the confidence interval cannot be used to decide with
95% confidence whether our web application handles at least
2% of the requests without accessing the web server or the file
server. A solution for reducing the size of the 0.95 confidence
interval so that this decision can be made is presented in the
remainder of this section.
Propositions 1 and 2 provide the means for calculating
a (1− α) =∏i∈I (1− αi) confidence interval for a PCTL
formula Φ from (1−αi) confidence intervals for the unknown
transition probabilities that Φ depends on. However, this result
does not address the selection of suitable αi values for a given
PCTL formula Φ, and a given set of observations O. In other
words, the results so far do not include a method for choosing
effective αi values starting from the (1− α) confidence level
for which we want to obtain a confidence interval for Φ.
The naive method of choosing all αi = 1 − (1− α)
1
#I as
in Example 3 is suboptimal.1 To see this result, suppose that
the algebraic expression for a PCTL formula associated with
the PMC from our running example in Fig. 1 is Φ(x1, y2) =
0.9x1+0.0001y2, and that we want to obtain a 0.95 confidence
interval for Φ. Because x1, and y2 are transition probabilities
associated with states s4, and s1, respectively, we need to
select α4 and α1 such that (1 − α4)(1 − α1) = 0.95. A
quick look at Φ(x1, y2) tells us that our formula is much
more sensitive to the variation of x1 than it is to the variation
of y2. Accordingly, a good choice of α4 and α1 is one
that yields a narrow (1 − α4) confidence interval for x1, at
the expense of obtaining a much wider (1 − α1) confidence
interval for y2. Thus, the combination (1 − α4) = 0.951 and
(1 − α1) = 0.95/0.951 = 0.998 will lead to a much narrow
0.95 confidence interval for Φ than the naive combination
(1 − α4) = (1 − α1) =
√
0.95 = 0.974. A similar analysis
shows that this result is also true for the algebraic expression
Φ′(x1, y2) = 0.5x1 + 0.5y2 that is equally sensitive to the
variation of x1 and y2, if the number of observations of
transitions from states s4 and s1 satisfies N4 ≪ N1.
To account for the logical dependencies discussed above,
FACT uses the hill-climbing optimisation heuristic de-
tailed in Algorithm 1. Given the algebraic expression
Φ(pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm) of a PCTL formula, a set of ob-
servations O, and an error level α, this heuristic synthesises a
(1 − α) confidence interval for Φ whose width is minimised
by using hill climbing to adjust the confidence levels (1−αi),
i ∈ I = {i1, i2, . . . , im}.
The algorithm works as follows. At any time during its
execution, the local variables bestA and bestB store the
bounds of the narrowest confidence interval identified by
the heuristic. The two variables are initialised with bounds
1Note that #I , the number of elements in I = {i1, i2, . . . , im}, is below
m if i1, i2, . . . , im are not all different.
8Algorithm 1 Confidence interval synthesis.
1: function CONFINTERVAL(Φ(pi1j1 , . . . , pimjm), O, α)
2: bestA← 0, bestB ← 1
3: for all i ∈ I do
4: αi ← 1− (1− α)
1
#I
5: end for
6: noImprovementSteps ← 0
7: while noImprovementSteps ≤MAX STEPS do
8: for all (i, j) ∈ I × {1, 2, . . . , n} do
9: calculate p
ij
, pij in (12) for O and αi
10: end for
11: calculate a, b in (11)
12: if b− a < bestB − bestA then
13: bestA← a, bestB ← b
14: noImprovementSteps ← 0
15: else
16: noImprovementSteps ++
17: end if
18: randomly adjust αi, i∈I , s.t.
∏
i∈I(1−αi) = 1−α
19: end while
20: return [bestA, bestB]
21: end function
corresponding to the most conservative confidence interval
possible (i.e., [0, 1]) in line 2, and their final values define
the confidence interval returned by the algorithm in line 20.
The for loop in lines 3 through 5 initialises the confidence
levels (1− αi), i ∈ I , with the same value 1− (1− α)1/#I .
As discussed above, these values typically produce subop-
timal results. Therefore, the while loop in lines 7 through 19
uses hill climbing to adjust them to reduce the width of the
confidence interval [bestA, bestB] in a number of steps that
involve
• calculating (1−αi) confidence intervals [pij , pij ] for the
unknown transition probabilities used in (11) (lines 8
through 10);
• obtaining the confidence interval [a, b] corresponding to
these confidence intervals (line 11);
• retaining the new confidence interval bounds a, b if they
represent an improvement over the bounds bestA, bestB
(lines 12 and 13); and
• performing a random adjustment of the confidence levels
(1 − αi), i ∈ I (line 18), as explained shortly in this
section.
The hill-climbing while loop in lines 7 through 19 is executed
until no improvement over the current bestA, bestB confi-
dence interval bounds is found for MAX STEPS consec-
utive steps, where MAX STEPS is a parameter of the al-
gorithm. To this end, the local variable noImprovementSteps
is used to count the number of consecutive steps that do not
reduce the width of the confidence interval [bestA, bestB].
This variable is initialised in line 6, incremented in line 16, and
reset to zero when a better confidence interval [bestA, bestB]
is identified (in line 14).
This completes the description of the algorithm, with the
exception of the random adjustment of the αi, i ∈ I , values
in line 18. The technique that FACT uses to perform this
adjustment involves randomly selecting two elements i, i′ ∈ I ,
i 6= i′, and applying the change
1− αi ← (1− αi)x
1− αi′ ← (1− αi′)/x ,
where x is a random value drawn repeatedly from a uniform
distribution over [0.9, 1.1] until the new values of (1−αi) and
(1−αi′) are both in the interval [0, 1]. Note that the value of
the product (1−αi)(1−αi′) is not affected by this adjustment,
so the property
∏
i∈I(1−αi) = 1−α (which is true after the
for loop in lines 3 through 5) will continue to hold after each
instance of this adjustment.
To analyse the time complexity of the algorithm, note that
each iteration of the while loop in lines 7 through 19 involves
the constant-time calculation of up to n2 confidence intervals
in lines 8 through 10, O(1) operations in lines 12 through 17,
the random adjustment of the αi confidence levels in line 18,
and the calculation of (11) in line 11. Unless n is extremely
large, or the expression Φ(pi1j1 , pi2j2 , . . . , pimjm) in (11) is
particularly simple, the time taken by the calculation of (11)
dwarfs that of the other operations.
Example 4. Consider one last time the QoS requirement
P≥0.02[Ψ] from our running example, with Ψ given by (10).
The 0.95 confidence interval [0.0195, 0.0461] that we com-
puted for P=?[Ψ] in Example 3 was insufficient to establish
with 95% confidence whether the requirement was satisfied
or not. We therefore used the implementation of Algorithm 1
described in Section V to obtain a tighter confidence interval.
The execution of the algorithm for MAX STEPS = 30
completed after 85 iterations of the while loop in lines
7 through 19, and we obtained the 10.07% narrower 0.95
confidence interval [0.0208, 0.0449], so we can conclude with
95% confidence that the QoS requirement from our running
example is satisfied.
Finally, remember that the aim of calculating the confidence
interval returned in line 20 of Algorithm 1 is to establish
whether M |=α,O P⊲⊳p[Ψ] by checking if [bestA, bestB] ⊲⊳ p
(cf. Definition 5). In case of a negative answer, there are two
scenarios.
1) When p /∈ [bestA, bestB], p is on the wrong side of
the interval [bestA, bestB] with respect to rules (7),
e.g., p > bestB for ⊲⊳ =<. In this scenario, P⊲⊳p[Ψ]
is not satisfied with confidence level (1− α), given the
observations O.
2) When p ∈ [bestA, bestB], the confidence interval is not
narrow enough to decide whether the property P⊲⊳p[Ψ]
is satisfied or not with the required confidence level,
and given the available observations. In this case, ad-
ditional observations can be used to obtain a narrower
confidence interval, which may allow a decision to be
made. The width of the confidence interval defined by
the bounds (12) is strictly decreasing with the number of
observations, and converges asymptotically to zero, so it
is theoretically possible to obtain a [bestA, bestB] con-
fidence interval that is as narrow as desired. However,
this action may require an impractically high number of
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Fig. 3. High-level architecture of the FACT tool chain
observations. Thus, it might be practically unfeasible to
establish if some QoS properties are satisfied with the
required level of confidence.
When the FACT analysis shows that a required QoS property
is not satisfied, or cannot provide a definite answer, then
the system designer has the option to modify the system
architecture or parameters, and to redo the analysis.
V. FACT TOOL CHAIN
To automate the two stages of the FACT process (Fig. 2),
we assembled a tool chain that integrates established mathe-
matical analysis tools and libraries, and a confidence interval
synthesiser that we developed specifically for FACT.
Fig. 3 shows the high-level architecture of the FACT tool
chain.
We use the probabilistic model checker PRISM [11] to
obtain an algebraic expression for the analysed property in
the parametric model checking stage of FACT. Starting with
version 4.2, PRISM supports the parametric model checking
of PCTL formulae2. More precisely, PRISM parametric model
checking [35], [36] supports the analysis of PMC models with
transition probabilities specified as functions over a set of
parameters. Depending on the analysed PCTL formula, the
result is given either as an algebraic expressions (i.e., rational
function over the parameters), or as a mapping from regions
of these parameters to rational functions or truth values.
For the confidence interval inference stage of FACT, we
developed a prototype confidence interval synthesiser tool in
Java. Our tool implements the FACT theoretical framework
from Section IV-B, and uses MATLAB [53], and the MAT-
LAB optimisation toolbox YALMIP [54], [55] to calculate
the confidence interval [a, b] in line 11 of Algorithm 1.
Our FACT confidence interval synthesiser is freely available
from http://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/∼raduc/FACT. Likewise,
the YALMIP toolbox is free of charge to use, and can be
downloaded from the project wiki [56].
VI. EVALUATION
To evaluate the effectiveness and generality of FACT, we
used our approach and tool chain to establish confidence
2PRISM’s implementation of parametric model checking re-implements the
techniques previously included in the PARAM model checker [46].
intervals for the QoS properties of two software systems from
different application domains, and across a wide range of
scenarios. The two case studies serve different purposes. The
former shows the potential of the approach, the role of its
parameters, and its performance. The latter case study shows
how FACT concretely supports engineers in establishing the
QoS properties of a real-world embedded system.
For both case studies, we first implemented simulators of
the analysed systems. We then used these simulators to obtain
observations of the events corresponding to the state transitions
from the system PMCs. To assess whether FACT produces cor-
rect results, we instantiated (i.e., fixed) the unknown transition
probabilities when collecting the observations. Next, we used
FACT to establish confidence intervals for the QoS properties
of each system starting from its observations. This approach
is the intended use of FACT in a real scenario. Finally, we
calculated the actual value of the same QoS properties starting
from the transition probability values used in the simulation.
This step is not possible in a real scenario, and is not part
of FACT. Its only purpose was to allow us to compare the
confidence intervals produced by FACT for a range of QoS
properties to the actual values of these properties.
A. Web application case study
1) Description: For the first case study, we considered the
business-critical web application from our running example
described in Section III. Table I shows the QoS requirements
for this application, in plain English, and formally specified
in PCTL. Requirements R1 through R3 are expressed as
state PCTL formulae (3), while requirements R4 through R5
formalise cost and response time constraints as reward PCTL
formulae (5).
As explained in Section II-C, each QoS requirement is
expressed by a PCTL formula that uses a fixed bound to
constrain the value of a QoS property of the system. For
example, the QoS property associated with requirement R2
is P=?[F HttpResponse] (i.e., the probability of successfully
handling a request), and R2 asks its value to be at least 0.995.
2) Experimental setup: To evaluate the effectiveness of
FACT in analysing the QoS properties of the web application,
we implemented a MATLAB simulator of the application. We
then ran the simulator with the PMC parameter values from
Table II, and we collected a wide range of state-transition
observations (6). Finally, we used these observations, and the
FACT tool chain in Fig. 3, to obtain confidence intervals
for the QoS properties of the web application. The purpose
of these experiments was to provide empirical evidence for
answering the following questions.
(a) What is the impact of varying the 1−α confidence level
in Fig. 3 on the confidence interval produced by FACT?
(b) How does the size of the observation set affect the
precision of confidence intervals?
(c) What are some typical numbers of observations required
to establish if the system complies with its requirements,
at difference confidence levels?
(d) How effective is the hill climbing Algorithm 1 at im-
proving the precision of confidence intervals?
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TABLE I
QOS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE WEB APPLICATION
ID Informal description PCTL formula
R1 Cache hit probability: “At least 65% of the requests are
handled without accessing the database or the file server.”
P≥0.65[¬(Database∨ FileServer)UHttpResponse]
R2 Reliability: “The probability of successfully handling a
request must be at least 0.995.”
P≥0.995[F HttpResponse]
R3 Complexity bound: “88% of the requests must be suc-
cessfully processed within 4 operations.”
P≥0.88[F
≤4 HttpResponse]
R4 Cost: “The average cost for handling a request must be
less 2.5 tenths of a cent.”
Rcost
≤2.5
[F HttpResponse ∨ ServerUnavailable ∨ TooManyConnections]
R5 Response time: “The average response time must be less
than 15 milliseconds.”
Rresponse
≤15
[F HttpResponse ∨ ServerUnavailable ∨ TooManyConnections]
TABLE II
PMC PARAMETERS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS
State Outgoing transition probabilities
s0 y1 = 0.4053, y2 = 0.5946, y3 = 0.0001
s3 x1 = 0.5790, x2 = 0.0005, x3 = 0.4205
s4 w1 = 0.9998, w2 = 0.0002
s5 z1 = 0.25065, z2 = 0.00125, z3 = 0.7481
s6 k1 = 0.9996, k2 = 0.0004
(e) What is the performance of the FACT toolset on a typical
computer?
3) Experimental results: For the parametric model check-
ing stage of the FACT analysis, we used version 4.2 of the
probabilistic model checker PRISM to obtain algebraic ex-
pressions for the QoS properties associated with requirements
R1 through R5 in Table I. These expressions are shown in
Table III.
For the confidence interval inference stage of FACT, we
used observations from the execution of our MATLAB imple-
mentation of the PMC in Fig. 1. Fig. 4 shows the 1− α con-
fidence intervals obtained for four typical sets of observations
that correspond to N observations of outgoing transitions from
each of the PMC states associated with unknown transition
probabilities, where 1 − α ∈ {0.85, 0.86, . . . , 0.99}, and
N ∈ {5000, 10000, 25000, 100000}. For simplicity, we will
use the notation O5K, O10K, O25K, and O100K to refer to the
four observation sets.
Note that these results include the actual values of the QoS
properties associated with requirements R1 through R5. These
values were obtained using PRISM to analyse the Markov
chain obtained by fixing all PMC parameters in Fig. 1 as
indicated in Table II, and are provided for reference. Of course,
these values are not available when FACT is used in a real-
world scenario. The graphs show also the requirement bounds
from Table I, with shaded areas for the parts of these graphs
that correspond to requirements being violated.
We analysed the results in Fig. 4 to answer questions (a)
through (c) from Section VI-A2 as follows.
(a) For any fixed number of observations N , the width of
the confidence interval increases supralinearly with the
confidence level 1 − α. This result is true for all anal-
ysed QoS properties. Furthermore, the 0.99 confidence
interval for each of the requirements R1 through R5
from our case study are at least twice as wide as the
0.85 confidence interval for the same requirement, across
all examined numbers of observations N . As a conse-
quence, given a fixed set of observations, establishing
compliance with a requirement is typically possible only
up to a certain level of confidence. As an example, for
observation set O10K, we can state that R1 is satisfied
with confidence level 0.94; or, using the notation in
(9), MwebApp |=0.06,O10K R1, where 0.06 = 1 − 0.94
represents the error level. In contrast, it is impossible
to establish that the requirement is satisfied with a 0.95
confidence level for O10K: MwebApp |=0.05,O10K/ R1.
(b) The width of the interval [bestA, bestB] computed
by Algorithm 1 is much smaller in experiments with
larger observation sets O. For instance, the intervals
[bestA, bestB] obtained for requirement R2 from Table I
and the observation sets O5K and O10K were not above
the R2 bound of 0.995 (i.e., bestA >/ 0.995) for any
1− α ≥ 0.85. In contrast, for the observation set O20K
and 0.85 ≤ 1 − α ≤ 0.95, the [bestA, bestB] interval
produced by Algorithm 1 satisfied bestA > 0.995. Thus,
according to Proposition 2, MwebApp |=0.05,O20K R2.
Similarly, in the experiment corresponding to O100K,
Algorithm 1 produced intervals with bestA > 0.995 for
all 1− α ≤ 0.99, so MwebApp |=0.01,O100K R2.
(c) Clearly, the number of observations required to establish
if the system complies with its QoS requirements with
a fixed level of confidence is influenced by how close
the requirement bounds are to the actual (unknown)
value of the associated QoS property. This effect is
illustrated qualitatively by the FACT analysis results for
requirements R2 and R3. For R2, a 0.99 confidence
interval that does not contain the requirement bound
0.995 is obtained only for the 100,000-observation set,
as the requirement bound is less than 0.005 away from
the actual value. In contrast, the requirement bound for
R3 is more than 0.04 away from the actual value, and
10,000 observations are sufficient to establish that R3 is
satisfied with 0.99 confidence level.
4) Hill climbing analysis: To evaluate the effectiveness of
the hill climbing technique employed by FACT, we recorded
the bounds of the confidence interval [bestA, bestB ] at the end
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TABLE III
ALGEBRAIC EXPRESSIONS FOR QOS REQUIREMENTS R1-R5
ID Algebraic expression
R1 (160y2x1 − 77z1y1 − 77z2y1 + 160y1)/160
R2 (−160w1y2x1− 160w1y2x2 +77k1z1y1 +160y2x1− 77z1y1− 77z2y1 +160w1y2 +160y1)/160
R3 (508y1 + 385y1z3 + 1000x1y2 + 1000y2x3w1)/1000
R4 (−160y2x1 − 160y2x2 + 308z1y1 + 497y1 + 320y2)/160
R5 (−640y2x1 − 640y2x2 + 539z1y1 + 640y2)/16
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Fig. 4. FACT 1− α confidence intervals for requirements R1 through R5, and observation sets of size N ∈ {5000, 10000, 25000, 100000}. The shaded
areas correspond to violations of the requirement bounds, and the actual values are given for the PMC parameters in Table II.
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Fig. 5. Hill-climbing refinement of the confidence interval for requirement R1.
TABLE IV
REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF CONFIDENCE INTERVALS THROUGH
HILL-CLIMBING OPTIMISATION, FOR THE EXPERIMENT IN FIG. 5
1− α initial interval final interval steps reduction
0.90 [0.6535, 0.7336] [0.6558, 0.7306] 51 6.6%
0.95 [0.6439, 0.7429] [0.6475, 0.7396] 39 6.9%
0.99 [0.6212, 0.7644] [0.6269, 0.7592] 63 7.6%
of each iteration of the while loop from lines 7 through 19 of
Algorithm 1.
Fig. 5 depicts a typical refinement of the confidence interval
for requirement R1 during the execution of Algorithm 1 with
MAX STEPS = 30, for three confidence levels, and the
observation set O10K from above. This diagram illustrates the
general trend of obtaining a larger reduction in the size of the
confidence intervals for larger confidence levels, for example
a 7.6% reduction for the 0.99 confidence interval compared to
a 6.6% reduction for the 0.90 confidence interval (Table IV).
Thus, we can answer question (d) from Section VI-A2.
(d) Hill climbing optimisation can improve the precision
of confidence intervals significantly, enabling a more
accurate analysis of QoS properties.
5) Performance analysis:3 The FACT verification time is
dominated by its confidence interval inference stage, with
the parametric model checking stage taking below 200ms to
obtain the algebraic expression in Table III for each of the
five requirements. Note also that the first FACT stage needs
to be performed only once for each requirement, whereas
the second stage must be executed for each confidence level
used in the analysis. Table V shows the execution times for
this second stage, and the experiments reported in Fig. 4. In
these experiments, the hill-climbing optimisation was stopped
after MAX STEPS = 50 steps that did not generate a
reduction in the size of the analysed confidence interval.
This rule explains why several experiments took precisely
50 optimisation steps; in these experiments, the hill climbing
could not find an improvement within its first MAX STEPS
steps. The MAX STEPS value used for these experiments
was larger than the one from the hill climbing analysis so we
could stretch the approach when evaluating its performance.
Based on these results, we can address our last question from
Section VI-A2.
(e) The time taken to establish confidence intervals using the
FACT toolset is dominated by the confidence interval
inference stage. Within this stage, the hill-climbing
optimisation of the initial solution takes most of the
time (above 98% for the experiments in Table V). The
average time required for one execution of optimisation
step ranged between 2.33s and 3.04s, and further investi-
gation showed that this range corresponds to the invoca-
tion of the MATLAB–YALMIP optimisation engine for
the calculation of the confidence interval bounds (11).
The overall time to obtain a confidence interval varied
between approximately 2 and 4 minutes on an off-the-
shelf laptop computer, so we concluded that the FACT
tool chain was sufficiently efficient to support the QoS
analysis of the non-trivial system in our case study.
To ensure that the results described above were not skewed
by the choice of PMC transition probabilities from Table II,
we repeated the experiments used to produce them for 100
randomly selected instantiations of the transition probabilities.
Given the large number of such experiments, we consid-
ered only the commonly used confidence levels (1 − α) ∈
{0.95, 0.99}, and we ran the experiments for observation sets
of size N = 10, 000. Thus, we used the FACT tool chain
to compute the two confidence intervals for each of the five
QoS requirements in Table I, and each of the 100 parameter
instantiations, running 1000 experiments in total.
For each experiment, we recorded the synthesised con-
fidence interval, the decrease in the size of this interval
due to the FACT hill climbing, and the total time taken to
compute the confidence interval. These experimental results
are summarised in Table VI, and are in line with the findings
presented earlier in this section. In particular, the confidence
interval sizes for all requirements are similar to those reported
3All experiments were carried out using a standard OS X 10.9.4 MacBook
Pro computer with a 2GHz Intel Core i7 processor, and 8GB 1600MHz
DDR3 RAM for the PRISM parametric model checking; and an OS X 10.9.4
Macbook Pro computer with a 2.3GHz Intel Core i7 processor, and 16 GB
1600 MHz DDR3 RAM for the confidence interval inference.
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TABLE V
CONFIDENCE INTERVAL INFERENCE TIME AND HILL-CLIMBING OPTIMISATION STEPS
5000-observation set, O5K 10000-observation set, O10K 25000-observation set, O25K 100000-observation set, O100K
ID average
hill
climbing
steps
average
step
time
[s]
average
time†
[s]
average
hill
climbing
steps
average
step
time
[s]
average
time†
[s]
average
hill
climbing
steps
average
step
time
[s]
average
time†
[s]
average
hill
climbing
steps
average
step
time
[s]
average
time†
[s]
R1 63.5 2.45 158.07 56.2 2.31 132.25 53.6 2.39 130.7 50.0 2.40 122.52
R2 50.0 3.04 155.35 50.0 2.68 137.15 50.0 2.65 135.27 50.0 2.59 132.24
R3 50.0 2.59 132.58 50.0 2.46 125.63 50.0 2.45 125.28 50.0 2.42 123.55
R4 87.2 2.35 208.08 50.0 2.46 125.63 72.8 2.33 172.36 50.0 2.49 136.43
R5 100.4 2.40 244.12 98.6 2.42 241.39 100.6 2.43 247.33 74.8 2.44 198.47
†The average time includes the time taken by the hill-climbing optimisation steps and by the other operations of Algorithm 1.
TABLE VI
PERFORMANCE OF CONFIDENCE INTERVAL COMPUTATION OVER 100 RANDOM PMC PARAMETER INSTANTIATIONS
0.95 confidence interval computation
confidence hill-climbing total
interval size gain† [%] time [s]
ID mean SD mean SD mean SD
R1 0.164 0.029 2.66 3.03 186.0 44.5
R2 0.109 0.025 10.8 4.67 165.7 37.5
R3 0.123 0.028 6.27 3.32 187.5 40.7
R4 0.362 0.074 11.8 3.74 213.8 59.2
R5 4.904 0.840 14.4 4.48 272.3 100.3
0.99 confidence interval computation
confidence hill-climbing total
interval size gain† [%] time [s]
ID mean SD mean SD mean SD
R1 0.237 0.042 2.70 3.02 381.7 75.0
R2 0.164 0.037 7.53 3.45 324.7 48.7
R3 0.180 0.041 4.64 2.69 385.9 74.4
R4 0.545 0.112 8.27 2.68 415.4 87.7
R5 7.436 1.202 10.2 2.73 570.5 189.7
†Decrease in confidence interval size due to hill climbing, relative to the confidence interval size without hill climbing.
in Fig. 4 for observation sets of size N = 10, 000, and the
two confidence levels, with small variations. As expected, the
interval sizes are higher for the 0.99 confidence intervals. The
use of hill climbing to reduce the confidence interval size
produced average gains of between 2.66% and 14.4%, similar
to those reported earlier in Fig. 5. Finally, the average time to
calculate a confidence interval was under 275s, and under 571s
for the 0.95, and 0.99 confidence intervals, respectively. The
longer time needed to compute confidence intervals for higher
(1 − α) confidence levels is due to an increased sensitivity
of the interval size to variations in the confidence level when
(1 − α) approaches 1.0. For instance, the difference in size
between 0.985 and 0.99 confidence intervals is much larger
than the difference in size between 0.945 and 0.95 confidence
intervals. Therefore, the hill climbing will take longer to
compute a stable confidence interval when operating with
confidence levels close to 1.0.
B. The Low-power Wireless Bus case study
1) Description: In this section, we present the application
of the FACT approach to a real-world embedded software
system from the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [57]
domain. Designing and implementing an efficient WSN system
requires the careful evaluation of multiple engineering choices,
to identify effective trade-offs between the quality properties
of the system. In particular, energy efficiency is the main QoS
aspect that drives the design of these systems.
One of the mainstream approaches to designing energy-
efficient WSN systems relies on evaluating alternative con-
figurations through formal modelling and analysis (e.g., [58]).
Accordingly, our case study applies FACT formal verification
to a WSN system that uses the Low-power Wireless Bus
(LWB) communication protocol [59]. LWB is a recently
proposed WSN communication protocol that turns a multi-hop
low-power wireless network into an infrastructure similar to a
shared bus, where all nodes are potential receivers of all data.
It achieves this structure by mapping all traffic demands on a
type of fast network floods (i.e., transmissions of one packet
from an originator node to all other nodes in the network)
called Glossy floods [60]. To avoid collisions between floods,
LWB uses a time-triggered operation: nodes communicate
according to a global communication schedule that determines
when a node is allowed to initiate a flood.
The protocol operates within communication rounds that
repeat with a round period T , computed at the host, and
based on the current traffic demands. Every round consists of a
number of non-overlapping communication slots. In each slot,
at most one node puts a message on the bus (initiates a Glossy
flood), whereas all other nodes read the message from the bus
(receive and relay the flood). A round starts and ends with
a slot allocated by the host to distribute the communication
schedule. The detailed description of the protocol is beyond
the scope of this paper, and can be found in [59].
2) Modelling LWB nodes: LWB has configuration parame-
ters whose choice influences its radio on-time (i.e., the time a
receiver node has its radio turned on during a network flood),
and thus the energy consumption of a node. In particular,
the choice of the LWB round period T in the acceptable
range 1000ms ≤ T ≤ 60, 000ms can lead to significantly
different energy consumptions. The selection of this parameter
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Fig. 6. Parametric Markov chain model of an LWB node, taken from [58].
TABLE VII
REWARD STRUCTURES FOR THE LWB MODEL IN FIG. 6
Energy consumption Start-up energy
State per period (‘period’) consumption (‘startup’)
Be (T-1000)/T T-1000
Bb 1000/T 1000
Re 35/T 35
Rb 145/T 145
Se 19/T 19
Sb 129/T 0
M1e 19/T 0
M1b 133/T 0
M2e 28/T 0
M2b 28/T 0
M3e 35/T 0
M3b 35/T 0
is based on the analysis of the worst-case radio on-time
of a node, which represents a measure of the worst-case
energy consumption of a WSN system. This analysis uses the
parametric Markov chain (PMC) of a LWB node introduced in
[58], and shown in Fig. 6. The unknown transition probability
ps in this PMC represents the probability for the node to
receive a schedule that was sent by the host.
For the analysis of the worst-case energy consumption
of an LWB node, the PMC in Fig. 6 is augmented with
the two reward structures detailed in Table VII. The former
structure associates each PMC state with the fraction of a
communication round for which the LWB node has the radio
switched on. The latter structure maps each PMC state to its
radio on-time during the start-up synchronisation between the
node and the host. Justifying the assumptions and accuracy of
this model is beyond the scope of our paper; these details can
be found in [58].
3) Using FACT to select the LWB round period: Table VIII
shows a pair of QoS requirements that are commonly used
to drive the selection of the round period T . Requirement R1
measures the expected steady-state energy consumption, while
requirement R2 measures the energy consumption during
the initial startup synchronisation with the host. The PCTL
formulae for these requirements correspond to the two reward
structures from Table VII.
Given these requirements, and the PMC in Fig. 6, engineers
TABLE VIII
LWB QOS REQUIREMENTS
ID Informal description PCTL formula
R1 Steady-state power consump-
tion: “The radio on-time per
period should be less than
5%.”
Rperiod
≤0.05
[S]
R2 Start-up power consumption:
“The start-up radio on-time
should be less than 40s.”
Rstartup
≤40
[F SynchBeginSch]
can use the FACT tool chain for the selection of a suitable
round period T as follows. First, as the probability of suc-
cessful schedule receipt ps is typically unknown, experiments
using the testbeds and settings described in [58] must be
carried out to estimate it empirically. The experimental data
are encoded as observation sets (6), and a confidence level
1−α for the analysis of the two requirements is decided. The
observation sets and confidence level are then used as inputs
for the FACT tool chain, together with the PMC model from
Fig. 6, and the PCTL formulae in Table VIII. Given these
inputs for multiple values of the round period T , our tool
chain synthesises 1 − α confidence intervals for each of the
two QoS properties, and each value of T .
Figs. 7 and 8 show the results of this FACT analysis
for a typical 1000-observation set (obtained through model
simulations for ps = 0.8), and a confidence level 1−α = 0.99.
These 0.99 confidence intervals illustrate the trade-off between
the steady-state energy usage (which decreases with T ) and
the start-up energy usage (which increases when T increases).
In this scenario, the two QoS requirements are satisfied with
probability 0.99 when the round period T is selected in
the interval [8000ms, 14, 000ms], because the threshold from
requirement R1 is met for T ≥ 8000ms, and the R2 threshold
is met for T ≤ 14, 000ms.
In contrast, using a point estimator instead of the confidence
interval generated by FACT may lead to suboptimal or invalid
choices for the LWB round period. As an example, the
application of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) [61]
to the 1000 observations of ps used in Figs. 7 and 8 yields
the point estimate pˆs = 0.794. The dotted MLE plots in
Figs. 7 and 8 show the variation of the two QoS properties
15
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Fig. 7. Steady-state energy consumption with increasing round period values.
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Fig. 8. Start-up energy consumption with increasing round period values.
with T when ps = pˆs = 0.794 in the PMC model from
Fig. 6. According to these results, the two QoS requirements
are satisfied for T values in the interval [6000ms, 20, 000ms].
This interval is much wider than the 0.99 confidence interval
generated by FACT, and the selection of a T value within
it provides no guarantees that the QoS requirements will
be satisfied with at least some minimum probability. FACT
addresses this important drawback of point estimates by en-
abling engineers to select LWB configurations guaranteed to
satisfy the quality requirements of the system with the required
minimum probability.
4) Performance: We carried out all the experiments for the
LWB case study using the computers with the specification in
Section VI-A5. As for our first case study, the parametric
model checking FACT stage completed in sub-second time
(i.e., 172ms for R1, and 184ms for R2). The algebraic expres-
sions generated by the PRISM probabilistic model checker for
this stage are shown in Table IX.
In the confidence interval synthesis stage of the FACT
approach, the 0.99 confidence intervals for R1 and R2 from
TABLE IX
ALGEBRAIC EXPRESSIONS FOR LWB QOS REQUIREMENTS R1 AND R2
ID Algebraic expression
R1 (12p10s − 427p
9
s + (T + 2322)p
8
s − (6T + 5972)p
7
s + (16T +
9815)p6s − (24T + 12027)p
5
s + (22T + 11102)p
4
s − (14T +
6277)p3s+(8T+2455)p
2
s−(4T+355)ps+T )/(2Tp
8
s−12Tp
7
s+
34Tp6s − 54Tp
5
s + 52Tp
4
s − 32Tp
3
s + 18Tp
2
s − 8Tps + 2T )
R2 (−1000p3s + 1035p
2
s − 355ps + T )/(p
3
s)
Figs. 7 and 8 were obtained for T = 1000ms, 2000ms, . . . ,
60, 000ms. This calculation involved evaluating the algebraic
expressions in Table IX for each of these values of T ,
and using the resulting expressions as input for the FACT
confidence interval synthesiser in Fig. 3. Because the only
unknown transition probability in these expressions is ps, the
only way to obtain a 0.99 confidence interval for R1 and
R2 is to start with a 0.99 confidence interval for ps. Thus,
hill-climbing optimisation to identify better combinations of
confidence levels for the unknown transition probabilities was
not required for the analysis of the LWB system. As a result,
each of the 120 confidence interval calculations (corresponding
to the two QoS requirements and the 60 values of T mentioned
above) took below 500ms.
VII. DISCUSSION
The experiments described in the previous section show the
feasibility and benefits of our FACT theoretical framework and
tool chain for formal verification with confidence intervals. In
particular, we demonstrated the application of FACT within
two case studies from different domains, to support the anal-
ysis of several types of QoS properties. The applicability of
FACT to other domains and to larger systems depends on the
capabilities of its two components from Fig. 2, i.e., parametric
model checking and confidence interval inference.
Parametric model checking, in particular, is computationally
expensive. The complexity of the early techniques for the
computation of symbolic expressions for reachability PCTL
properties for an n-state model is as high as nΘ(logn) [45].
However, parametric model checking is a new area of research,
and newer techniques operate with much lower overheads.
Thus, the approach from [35] is much faster than [45] in
many practical scenarios, and the most recent result from this
area reports speed-ups of up to several orders of magnitude
[37]. The probabilistic model checker used for the parametric
model checking step of the FACT tool chain, i.e., PRISM [11],
implements the techniques from [35], [36], and was able to
generate all the symbolic expressions for each of the QoS
properties from our smaller but realistic case studies in under
200ms. Using a model checker that implements the efficient
parametric model checking technique from [37] will enable
FACT to scale to much larger system sizes.
Confidence interval inference is also computationally ex-
pensive. Our FACT tool chain is based on the MATLAB
optimisation toolbox YALMIP [54], [55] configured to use
its own, free global optimization solver based on [62], which
needs 2s to 3s to execute each step of the FACT hill climbing
algorithm for the QoS properties in Section VI. However,
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YALMIP can also be configured to use the much faster,
state-of-the-art industrial optimiser Gurobi [63], which again
provides an opportunity for scaling up FACT to larger system
sizes than presented in the previous section.
Finally, the FACT theoretical framework presented in this
paper considers PMCs whose unknown transition probabilities
are specified as variables. This approach differs from the
PMC definition in, e.g., [35], [36], [37], where transition
probabilities are expressed as fractions of polynomials over
a set of variables (i.e., the system parameters). Extending the
FACT theoretical framework to handle transition probabilities
expressed as rational functions of the system parameters is
certainly possible, and would involve operating with obser-
vations and confidence intervals of the system parameters
instead of the unknown transition probabilities. The main
implication would be an increase in the complexity of the
symbolic expressions of the analysed QoS properties. This
may happen if complex rational functions are used to specify
the unknown transition probabilities. However, the current
research [35], [37] is based on case studies that use rational
functions similar to those from our case studies [64]. Several
examples of these rational functions include p and 1 − p,
and q and 1 − q for the two sets of unknown transition
probabilities of a Zeroconf protocol [65] PMC available from
[66], and identically formulated functions for the two sets of
unknown transition probabilities of a Crowds protocol [67]
PMC available from [68].
VIII. RELATED WORK
Markov chains are widely used for the verification of
reliability, performance, and other QoS properties of software
and hardware systems. However, in many practical appli-
cations, the MC state transition probabilities are estimated
experimentally, leading to uncertainty and imprecisions that
may affect the accuracy of the results. To the best of our
knowledge, FACT is the first approach that supports formal
verification of Markov chains that exploits confidence intervals
to quantitatively account for this uncertainty. In this section,
we survey several approaches that investigated similar or
related challenges.
Interval-valued discrete-time Markov chains (IDTMC) were
introduced in [69] to incorporate uncertainty in traditional
MCs by assuming that transition probability values lie within
a range or interval of possible values. IDTMCs were subse-
quently refined and generalised to models that include generic
convex sets of probabilities in [70]. The approaches in [69],
[70] addressed the important problem of incorporating uncer-
tainty into Markov chains. However, their scope is limited to
the model definition. Unlike FACT, these approaches do not
tackle the challenge of propagating the uncertainty captured by
the model to properties of the model expressed in probabilistic
temporal logic.
Benedikt et al. [33] provide lower and upper bounds on the
complexity of evaluating ω-regular specification satisfiability
in IDTMCs, and an expectation maximisation algorithm that
starts from an IDTMC and produces a sequence of refinements
of increasing probability of satisfying an ω-regular property.
The Tulip model checking tool [33] uses this algorithm to
calculate an approximation for the maximum probability with
which an IDTMC model satisfies one of these properties.
This approximation is then used for the iterative refinement
and modification of an existing model, to obtain a model
variant that satisfies the original property (see also the existing
approaches for model repair [71]). Accordingly, the technique
devised by Benedikt et al. [33] is the inverse of our FACT
approach, which starts from a given uncertain model, and
establishes if the model meets a specification with the required
confidence level.
Uncertainty in PCTL verification is taken into account
by [34] through modelling systems as IDTMCs interpreted
semantically as either uncertain Markov chains (UMCs) or
interval Markov decision processes (IMDPs). The former in-
terpretation is often useful in scenarios where state transitions
of the system are known to lie within a specific interval of
probabilities, while the latter interpretation generalises MDPs
to an uncountable set of non-deterministic choices to be
taken at each state transition, modelling variations within the
system’s environment during execution. Chatterjee et al. [72]
extend PCTL to express ω-regular conditions. Model checking
of these specifications are considered under various semantic
interpretations of IDTMCs, proving upper and lower complex-
ity bounds. Chen et al. [73] improve these results by demon-
strating that the reachability probability for IDTMCs coincides
under UMC and IMDPs semantics, and is P-complete. They
use an ellipsoid method to yield a polynomial-time verification
algorithm. The PCTL model checking problem is shown to
be P-complete under the IMDP semantics, and reducible to
the square-root-sum problem under the UMC semantics. [74]
extends interval-bounded models to more general forms of
likelihood models and ellipsoidal models, to improve transi-
tion uncertainty in cases where probabilities are determined
experimentally.
Although the above results address the verification of PCTL
formulae over models affected by uncertainty, several unique
characteristics distinguish FACT from them. First, FACT op-
erates with parametric Markov chains with unknown transition
probabilities specified as sets of observations. This operation
makes our approach particularly suitable for practical appli-
cations, in which the transition probabilities are unknown,
and need to be derived from observations. Second, FACT
is uniquely capable of establishing confidence intervals for
PCTL properties at any requested confidence level. Thirdly,
our approach uses hill-climbing optimisation to reduce the
width of its confidence intervals over a number of iterations.
Last but not least, FACT can be readily used in practice, thanks
to a tool chain that automates all steps of the approach.
In another area of related research, [47], [75] use pertur-
bation analysis to compute bounds for the probabilistic model
checking of parameterised discrete-time Markov chains. These
bounds measure the sensitivity of the model to parameter
changes, predict the maximal variations in verification results
with respect to the amount of perturbation in the model, and
may also specify boundaries for the variation of a verification
result. This work complements the approach presented in our
paper, as it analyses the relevance of different model param-
17
eters for a given PCTL property. In contrast, FACT handles
the propagation of uncertainty in the model parameters during
the verification process, to establish if the system behaves as
expected, with the required level of confidence.
Finally, Bortolussi et al. [76] explore statistical model
checking to determine the satisfiability probability of metric
interval temporal logic formulae for continuous-time Markov
chains with parametric uncertainty. They provide approxima-
tions of satisfaction functions as an estimate of the probability
for formula satisfiability for all parameter values from obser-
vations of individual runs of the system. Given samples of
model parameters, the approach evaluates the probability of
satisfaction of the property of interest. This differs from FACT,
which focuses instead on discrete-time parametric Markov
chains, and synthesises confidence intervals for the analysed
property at any required confidence level.
IX. CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK
We introduced FACT, the first tool-supported approach for
establishing the quality properties of software systems using
formal verification with confidence intervals. Our paper con-
tributes to the research on the formal verification for complex
software systems by proposing a novel approach to synthesis-
ing confidence intervals for PCTL verification over parametric
Markov models, given a set of observations of the system,
and a required level of confidence. The proposed solution has
been implemented using a tool chain that integrates established
model checking and mathematical analysis tools, and a freely
available tool that we developed to automate the confidence
interval inference stage of the approach.
The evaluation of the FACT approach and tool chain in two
case studies from different domains show that FACT produces
useful confidence intervals, across wide ranges of confidence
levels and observation sets. For the verified QoS properties
(depending on between one and seven unknown transition
probabilities), the synthesis of the confidence intervals took
between half a second (for univariate properties) and just over
four minutes (for properties depending on multiple unknown
probabilities). The further exploration of the FACT perfor-
mance and scalability represents an area of future work for
our project. However, note that the two stages are impacted
differently by the size of the verified Markov chain. Thus, the
parametric model checking stage will be heavily dependent on
the size of the model. Note, however, that this stage needs to be
executed only once for a given model and property. In contrast,
the confidence interval inference stage of FACT is executed
each time when a new set of observations is available, or a
confidence interval is required at a new level of confidence.
We hypothesise that the time required to carry out this stage is
s-independent of the original model size, and depends primar-
ily on the number of unknown transition probabilities from
the parametric Markov chain. A large number of experiments
will be needed to assess the validity of this hypothesis.
The two case studies presented in the paper show that FACT
can be used to analyse multiple quality aspects of software
systems, including reliability, performance, cost, and energy
consumption. In future work, we will explore the possibility
to extend the approach to other modelling formalisms and
verification logics, with a view to support the verification of
additional quality properties of software systems. Continuous-
time Markov chains and continuous stochastic logic represent
strong candidates for this extension, as they enable the mod-
elling and analysis of system characteristics not covered by
discrete-time Markov models and PCTL.
In recent work, we advocated the run-time use of quan-
titative verification in business- and safety-critical systems
that need to self-adapt to changes in their environment or
requirements [16], and we successfully applied run-time quan-
titative verification to multiple software systems [17], [18],
[19], [27], [44]. The integration of FACT with these results
has the potential to provide stronger guarantees that self-
adaptive software systems meet their QoS requirements than
is currently possible otherwise.
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